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The Pitfalls of Dealing with Witnesses in Public
Corruption Prosecutions
PETER J. HENNING*
A faithful witness is one that will not lie, but a false witness launches forth mere
lies. Proverbs 14:5
INTRODUCTION
Then Attorney General Michael Mukasey said in 2008 that "[t]he investigation
and prosecution of public corruption is among the highest obligations of law
enforcement, and it should come as no surprise that I consider it to be one of the
top priorities of the Department of Justice."' These cases are significant not only
because the defendants are usually leading public figures in cities and states, and
sometimes on the national scene, but even more so because they involve a core
value of our democratic form of government, that public authority cannot be used
for private gain.
The importance of public corruption cases often is matched by the difficulty
that prosecutors face in bringing them successfully because the government
frequently relies on cooperating witnesses who were involved in highly
questionable dealings. A number of recent prosecutions highlight the crucial role
of the cooperating witness for the government's case and how that witness can
bring a case down if the government is not careful.' The prosecution of former
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens on charges of filing false statements presented
graphically the dangers a cooperating witness can pose if prosecutors are not
careful.
Bill Allen, the former chairman of an Alaskan company, provided the critical
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author may be contacted at
peter.henning@wayne.edu. I appreciate the comments and suggestions of Lee Radek, Esq., and Professors
Bruce Green, Leonid Feller, Mark Armitage, and John Dolan on earlier drafts, and the usual fine editorial
assistance of Olive Hyman.
1. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Dep't of Justice Public Corruption Efforts, (Mar. 27, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/bpa/pr/2008/March/08-ag-246.html.
2. For example, the bribery investigation of former Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham, which
resulted in his guilty plea and a 96-month sentence, was made in large part through the cooperation of lobbyist
Mitchell Wade. See Greg Moran, Contractor in Scandal to Learn Fate Soon: Wade Cooperated in Cunningham
Probe, SAN DIEO UNIoN-TRm., Dec. 14, 2008, at B1.
The prosecution of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich may be the rare corruption case that does not
need witness testimony to show a defendant's corrupt intent, although even here it would likely help the
Department of Justice if it could put on testimony showing Blagojevich acting similarly in other situations.
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testimony about gifts given to the Senator that the Senator failed to report to the
Senate.3 As often happens in corruption cases, Allen's story changed over time;
however, prosecutors failed to disclose to the defense the star witness's
exculpatory statements made during trial preparation, a due process violation
under Brady v. Maryland.4  Months after a jury convicted the Senator-
instrumental in his narrow defeat at the polls shortly after the verdict-Attorney
General Eric Holder announced that the government asked the court to drop the
case due to the failure to disclose information about its key witness.5 A short time
later, the Department of Justice asked that the convictions of two former Alaska
state legislators also be reversed because of disclosure issues related to similar
statements made by Allen in those cases.6
For prosecutors in public corruption cases, having someone who was "in the
room" when the transaction occurred is crucial to establish the reason for offer or
solicitation of a corrupt benefit. Such transactions involve a process that likely
includes a number of interactions that may have taken place over weeks or even
months. Government officials, particularly those in elective office, have numer-
ous meetings and deal with a variety of constituencies, including lobbyists and
campaign contributors. Separating out the ordinary intercourse of political life
from the illicit transfer of benefits or money in exchange for the exercise of
3. See Richard Mauer & Erika Bolstad, Close Friendship: Former Veco Boss Tells of Admiration For
Senator, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2008, at Al.
4. See Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al
(discussing decision to dismiss charges against Senator Stevens because notes of an earlier conversation
between a prosecutor and Allen were discovered that contradicted his trial testimony). In Brady v. Maryland, the
Supreme Court held, "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The prosecution's Brady obligations are
among the most fundamental requirements for a fair trial, and are frequently litigated, particularly in cases
involving cooperating witnesses.
5. Attorney General Holder issued the following statement:
In connection with the-post-trial litigation in United States v. Theodore F Stevens, the Department of
Justice has conducted a review of the case, including an examination of the extent of the disclosures
provided to the defendant. After careful review, I have concluded that certain information should have
been provided to the defense for use at trial. In light of this conclusion, and in consideration of the
totality of the circumstances of this particular case, I have determined that it is in the interest of justice
to dismiss the indictment and not proceed with a new trial.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding United States v.
Theodore F. Stevens (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/opapr/2009/April/O9-ag-288.html. The district court
granted the government's motion to dismiss, and the prosecutors assigned to the case are being investigated by
the Office of Professional Responsibility in the Department of Justice.
6. In a statement reminiscent of what he said about the Stevens case, Attorney General Holder stated, "After a
careful review of these cases, I have determined that it appears that the Department did not provide information
that should have been disclosed to the defense." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Dep't Asks Alaska Corruption Cases Be
Remanded to District Court, Former State Representatives Be Released (June 4, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-550.html. Unlike in the Stevens case, however, the government did not request that the
court dismiss the charges, but instead sought to have the case remanded to the district court to determine
whether to allow a retrial of the charges. See id.
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government authority is almost impossible without a witness who was present. At
the same time, a cooperating witness presents dangers because of the possibility
of fabrication.7
All trial lawyers know the importance of witness preparation. As Professor
Applegate pointed out, "American litigators regularly use witness preparation,
and virtually all would, upon reflection, consider it a fundamental duty of
representation and a basic element of effective advocacy." 8 How far can a lawyer
go, however, in preparing, or perhaps even "coaching," a witness by supplying
information or suggesting responses that can shape the person's testimony so that
it comes across well to the jury? The professional responsibility rules are largely
silent on the issue of witness preparation and there are few judicial opinions on
what is and is not acceptable in preparing a witness to testify.9
In this Article, I consider the meager guidance the various authorities on the
professional responsibility of lawyers provide on the question of witness
preparation. Each attorney must decide the issue for himself or herself because
the interaction between counsel and witnesses will in all likelihood never be
exposed to outside scrutiny; l° issues of privilege and the lack of any bright-line
rules make it one the attorney must ultimately resolve. The question is not
whether the lawyer can get away with allowing-or even encouraging-a client
to present false testimony, but whether the lawyer will take the steps necessary to
recognize when the potential for perjury exists and work to prevent its
occurrence.
Part I outlines federal corruption statutes and highlights how the corrupt intent
element is the central focus of the crime.11 The cooperating witness provides key
testimony that can establish the public official's intent that cannot be shown
easily from documents or other evidence. Part II discusses the importance of the
7. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 847 (2002) ("The
cooperating witness is probably the most dangerous prosecution witness of all. No other witness has such an
extraordinary incentive to lie. Furthermore, no other witness has the capacity to manipulate, mislead, and
deceive his investigative and prosecutorial handlers.").
8. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REv. 277, 278-79 (1989).
9. See id. at 279 ("The line between preparing and prompting (or 'coaching,' the usual term of opprobrium) is
rarely clear even for the most scrupulous."). Professor Applegate describes witness preparation as "one of the
dark secrets of the legal profession." Id.
10. See Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 23 (1995) ("Lawyers
typically interview and prepare witnesses in private surroundings, preferably in a quiet office with the door
closed and with no strangers present. Because Grade One witness coaching [that results in the witness providing
false testimony] is so obviously dishonest, no sensible lawyer would try it with a witness who might be inclined
to report it, or in the presence of a third person who might be inclined to report it. Further, the work product
immunity, and sometimes the attorney-client privilege, help shield conversations between lawyers and
witnesses from probing by adversary counsel.").
11. See RoLLIN M. PERKNs & RONALD N. BoYcE, CRIMNAL LAW 536-37 (3d ed. 1982) ("A corrupt intent is
essential to guilt of bribery but it is important to keep in mind just what constitutes corruption in this regard ....
On the part of the bribee, an intent to use the opportunity to perform a public duty as a means of acquiring an
unlawful personal benefit or advantage, is a corrupt intent.").
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cooperating witness in a corruption case. Part Ell reviews the vague guidance
provided by the legal ethics rules, noting how the broad proscription on in-
troducing false testimony is of little aid in determining what is permissible in
witness preparation. Part IV examines two particularly pertinent issues in public
corruption cases for lawyers on both sides: the Brady disclosure obligation for
prosecutors and the requirement to avoid perjured testimony, particularly by the
defendant, for defense counsel. This Article concludes that the ethics rules
provide little help to the attorneys, ultimately leaving it to the individual lawyer
to ensure that the uncertain line between permissible preparation and creating
false evidence is not crossed.
I. PROSECUTING PUBLIC CORRUPTION
Federal public corruption prosecutions can be 'brought under a range of
statutes, from those sections that proscribe bribery and unlawful gratuities, 12 to
the Hobbs Act, which prohibits extortion "under color of official right,"1 3 to mail
and wire fraud provisions that reach a scheme to defraud the victim of "the right
of honest services.' 1 4 Although these statutes contain different elements, and a
combination of them can be brought in a single indictment, the unifying theme
among them is proving the defendant's intent to abuse government authority. In
the criminal law parlance, these are "specific intent" crimes, which means that the
jury must infer the defendant's particular state of mind at the time a benefit was
received. 15
What distinguishes public corruption prosecutions from other types of white
collar crimes is the need to prove, in some fashion, that the defendant acted
"corruptly" and did not simply engage in an accepted method of doing business.
For example, section 201, which applies to federal and District of Columbia
officials, and section 666, which applies to state and local governments, both
explicitly require the government to prove that the defendant "corruptly" gave
or accepted a bribe. 16 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Hobbs Act's
12. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (bribery and unlawful gratuities for federal and District of Columbia officials); 18
U.S.C. § 666 (bribery and rewards for state and local officials, those working for programs receiving federal
funding, and Indian tribal officials).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 195 1(a) and (b)(2) (prohibiting extortion "under color of official right").
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (defining scheme to
defraud to include the "intangible right of honest services").
15. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the Supreme Court explained that "for bribery
there must be a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official
act." 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (emphasis in original).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (Whoever "being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly
or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value
personally or for any other person or entity.. ."); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (Whoever "corruptly solicits or
demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person,
intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of
such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more...").
[Vol. 23:351
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prohibition on extortion to incorporate bribery, requiring proof of a quid pro quo
agreement that was corrupt and not a legitimate transaction, such as a campaign
contribution. 17 A scheme to defraud the public of the right of honest services
owed by an official under the mail and wire fraud statutes covers a range of
conduct, from bribery to kickbacks to misuse of office for personal gain, that
require proof of an intent to gain from a violation of the person's fiduciary duty,
meaning corruptly.18
The term "corruptly" does not have a fixed meaning and courts struggle to give
it any more content than an imprecise reference to a defendant's contemptible
state of mind. The Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen L.L.P v. United States
described "corruptly" as "normally associated with wrongful, immoral, de-
praved, or evil." 19 In United States v. Rooney, the Second Circuit stated that "a
fundamental component of a 'corrupt' act is a breach of some official duty owed
to the government or the public at large."2 ° In United States v. Kelly, the same
court upheld a jury instruction that defined "corruptly" as "to act with the intent to
secure an unlawful advantage or benefit either for one's self or for another.",
21
II. TiE IMPORTANCE OF WITNESSES
Showing an improper motive or desire to obtain an unlawful advantage is
difficult to establish by way of documentary evidence. Perhaps more than any
other area of white collar crime, the public corruption case requires the testimony
of witnesses who can provide some insight into the defendant's knowledge of
the impropriety of the transaction. Rarely will a document clearly establish that
the offer of a benefit was given to obtain official action or that an official's
statement was indeed the solicitation of a bribe and not simply a request for
support or a campaign contribution. Especially in cases involving elected
officials, the testimony of those who make the payments or facilitate the
transfer-the intermediaries who surround every politician and the donors who
appear with regularity-are usually the linchpin of the prosecution.22
17. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991) ("[I]f the payments to McCormick were
campaign contributions, proof of a quid pro quo would be essential for an extortion conviction.").
18. See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 730 (1st Cit. 1995) ("[A] bribery-like, corrupt intent to
influence official action necessarily is an intent to deprive the public of an official's honest services."); United
States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 213-14 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Ring's alleged awareness of congressional rules
and his agreement to give gifts 'in exchange for' official action would demonstrate that he had the knowledge
and corrupt intent necessary to violate the wire fraud statute.").
19. Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. United States, 544 U.S. 696,705 (2005).
20. United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847, 852 (2d Cir. 1994).
21. United States v. Kelly, 147 F3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998).
22. For example, in the successful prosecution of former Louisiana Representative William Jefferson, a key
witness was a cooperating witness who was videotaped paying the Congressman $100,000, of which $90,000
was later found hidden in a freezer in his home. See Jonathan Tilove, Guilty on 11 Counts, NEw ORLEANs
TMEs-PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 2009.
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The importance of witness testimony to the government's case often is
matched by the need for the defense to put on witnesses to explain that no intent
to corrupt the exercise of government authority existed. An important feature of
the defense case will be to call into question those individuals who provided
information to the government, showing that they misunderstood the interaction
or, perhaps worse, fabricated their testimony to avoid responsibility. Frequently,
the best witness is the defendant, but putting him on the witness stand is always a
risky proposition even if almost a necessity in a public corruption prosecution.
Especially when the defendant is an elected official, there is enormous pressure
for the person to testify and explain how there was no corrupt motive, even where
the transaction has the aura of impropriety. A failure to take the witness stand by a
person whose political career involves taking-and explaining-public positions
could be viewed as tantamount to an admission of the crime. Moreover, most
politicians believe that if given the chance to explain themselves, they can
convince a jury of their innocence. Under the professional responsibility rules,
the client, not the lawyer, decides whether to testify,23 and the lure of the witness
stand (and perhaps one last performance) can be overwhelming.
The central role of witnesses in the assessment of the meaning of "corruptly"
means that the lawyers preparing them to testify play a particularly important role
in the case. While the documents can provide crucial support for testimony,
records are often ambiguous and rarely yield much insight into a defendant's state
of mind. For the defense, the decision whether to put the defendant on the witness
stand is frequently the most important issue in the trial because the defendant's
testimony is often paramount' in the jury's mind when it decides the case.
Ensuring that the cooperating witness and the defendant are prepared for the
onslaught of cross-examination can make the difference in a close case.
1I. THE ETHICS OF WITNESS PREPARATION
The rules of professional conduct say surprisingly little about the topic of
witness preparation, even though they are designed to regulate significant aspects
of the legal process. 24 Courts recognize that witness preparation is common in all
forms of litigation. As one district court noted:
[I]t could scarcely be suggested that it would be improper for counsel who
called the witness to review with him prior to the deposition the testimony to be
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RuLEs] ("In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether
to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.").
24. See Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Note, Professional Conduct and the Preparation of Witnesses for Trial:
Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching", 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 389, 389 (1987) ("There remains,
however, a vast realm of conduct that could potentially be characterized as improperly seeking to influence a
witness' testimony. Within this area, there are very few guideposts to assist the attorney in maximizing his
effectiveness as advocate while still remaining within the recognized limits of professional responsibility.").
[Vol. 23:351
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elicited. It is usual and legitimate practice for ethical and diligent counsel to
confer with a witness whom he is about to call prior to his giving testimony,
whether the testimony is to be given on deposition or at trial.25
Judges expect counsel for each side to have their witnesses ready to testify and
to present the evidence in an orderly fashion. As the North Carolina Supreme
Court stated:
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to explain the
applicable law in any given situation and to go over before trial the attorney's
questions and the witness' answers so that the witness will be ready for his
appearance in court, will be more at ease because he knows what to expect, and
will give his testimony in the most effective manner that he can. Such
preparation is the mark of a good trial lawyer, and is to be commended because
it promotes a more efficient administration of justice and saves court time.26
A lawyer is required to represent his or her client competently, and it likely
would be viewed as malpractice for trial counsel tocall an unprepared witness if
there was a chance to meet and interview the person in advance, even if only for a
few minutes.27 The District of Columbia Bar once stated in an ethics opinion, "a
lawyer who did not prepare his or her witness for testimony, having had an
opportunity to do so, would not be doing his or her professional job properly." 28
At the other end of the spectrum, Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) states that a lawyer
shall not "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the
lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence
and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. '29 The
prohibition on introducing perjured testimony is clear, but whether a lawyer has
allowed, or perhaps even led, a witness-including a client-to present false
evidence is fairly uncommon, and the secrecy of witness preparation means it
will rarely become known that a lawyer violated the rule by suggesting how a
witness should testify in a way that is untruthful.
The issue of witness preparation sliding into falsity is, I suspect, rarely one of
outright falsehood by the witness, when the person simply fabricates a story.
Instead, the witness more likely will present his or her recall more clearly than in
fact was the case before the lawyer suggested how to respond to questions;
perhaps the opposite may happen as well, that the witness will respond "I don't
25. Hamdi & Ibrahim Mango, Co. v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 20 F.R.D. 181, 182 (S.D.N.Y 1957).
26. State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880, 882 (N.C. 1979).
27. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation."); see also Applegate, supra note 8, at 289 ("The obligation to prepare, in sum, is clear from the
duties of competence and zealousness, however, the extent of that obligation is not clear.").
28. DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA Emcs Op. No. 79 (Dec. 18, 1979).
29. MODEL RuLES R. 3.3(a)(3).
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recall" when in fact the person does remember what occurred. Telling a witness
what will play well before a jury could be benign, or it could be a means of
changing the evidence to support one side's position.
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers addresses witness preparation explicitly and gives its imprimatur to a
wide range of conduct that shapes a witness's testimony. Section 116(1) provides
that "[a] lawyer may interview a witness for the purpose of preparing the witness
to testify."'30 This section appears to condone only a lawyer listening to what a
witness has to say in an "interview," largely a passive exercise. Comment (b) to
this section, however, goes on to provide a list of permissible steps the lawyer can
take in preparing the witness that go far beyond merely interviewing the person
about their testimony:
[D]iscussing the role of the witness and effective courtroom demeanor;
discussing the witness's recollection and probable testimony; revealing to the
witness other testimony or evidence that will be presented and asking the
witness to reconsider the witness's recollection or recounting of events in that
light; discussing the applicability of law to the events in issue; reviewing the
factual context into which the witness's observations or opinions will fit;
reviewing documents or other physical evidence that may be introduced; and
discussing probable lines of hostile cross-examination that the witness should
be prepared to meet.
3 1
The Comment then states that "[w]itness preparation may include rehearsal of
testimony" and that a "lawyer may suggest choice of words that might be
employed to make the witness's meaning clear.",32 Again, these steps are hardly
the passive acts of interviewing a witness. Perhaps to assuage any fear that the
Restatement is encouraging false testimony, the Comment ends with the careful
admonition that "a lawyer may not assist the witness to testify falsely as to a
material fact," but makes no effort to describe what the limits are on proper
33witness preparation.
Under the Restatement's analysis, almost anything short of showing the
witness how to commit perjury appears to be acceptable. Can the rules of the
profession really take an "anything goes" approach so long as the lawyer does not
assist the witness in presenting patently false testimony? It would be hard to find
any type of preparation short of the lawyer instructing the witness to fabricate a
story that would not be defensible under the Comment to section 116.
Consider a session in which a lawyer and witness rehearse the testimony that
will occur the next day. Professor Applegate raises the issue of whether this type
30. REsTATEmENT (THRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 116(1) (2000).
31. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF THE LAW GOvERNiNG LAWYERS § 116(b) cmt. I (b) (2000) (emphasis added).
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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of preparation undermines the truth-seeking function of a trial:
Rehearsal is in a sense the ultimate witness-preparation technique. It treats the
trial precisely as a play scripted by the lawyers. Rehearsal goes beyond
providing factual information or documents to familiarize the witness with the
subject matter of the upcoming testimony. It is more intensive than simply
providing demeanor suggestions. Most important, it comes uncomfortably
close to the line between the lawyer's knowing what would help the case and
the lawyer's advising the client how to help the case. 34
As is typical in this and many other areas of legal ethics, the line between
proper and improper conduct is so close as to be almost imperceptible. Professor
Wydick noted that rehearsing testimony may be ethical or unethical, depending
on the lawyer's (and the witness's) motivation:
Witness preparation sessions often end with role playing by the lawyer and
witness. Typically, the lawyer questions the witness on several topics using ihe
style she will use during direct examination. Then she, or one of her colleagues,
cross-examines using the style the adversary lawyer is likely to use. If the
purpose of role playing is merely to accustom the witness to the rough and
tumble of being questioned, then it is ethically unobjectionable. If, however,
the lawyer uses the role playing session as an occasion for scripting the
witness's answers, then it is unethical.35
There is no clear external or objective indicator about when a particular form
of witness preparation is unethical and when it is perfectly consistent with the
lawyer's responsibility to competently represent a client and seek a lawful
objective. Thus, lawyers are left on their own to determine whether their
preparation of a witness is taking them close to the line of Model Rule 3.3's
prohibition on false evidence.
IV. PREPARING WITNESSES AND CLIENTS TO TESTIFY
A 1979 District of Columbia Bar ethics opinion issued, interpreting the now
largely defunct Disciplinary Rules, highlights that the lawyer is responsible for
determining when the line between permissible preparation and impermissible
creation of false evidence has been crossed.3 6 The Opinion states that "it is not,
we think, a matter of undue difficulty for a reasonably competent and con-
scientious lawyer to discern the line of impermissibility, where truth shades into
untruth, and to refrain from crossing it.' ' 37 Would that life were so easy for
34. Applegate, supra note 8, at 323.
35. Wydick, supra note 10, at 16.
36. DISTRICr OF COLUMBIA ETHIcs Op. No. 79, supra note 28.
37. Id.
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lawyers that they could always discern the lines.38
Public corruption cases are about the intent of the offeror and recipient, and a
jury must decide whether the reason for the transaction entailed the intentional
misuse of government authority for personal gain. Whether the case involves
gifts or other benefits to an official, or payments that may be campaign
contributions, the determination of what was in the minds of the parties-
whether the conduct was "corrupt"-will usually determine whether a guilty
verdict is returned. For the prosecution, its key witness on this issue is likely to be
a person who has agreed to cooperate in the case, often in exchange for a reduced
sentence or, less frequently, a grant of immunity. For the defense, the public
official's testimony will be crucial to the case because he is usually the only
person who can explain what was understood about the relationship that is
alleged to be corrupt.
Among the many temptations an attorney may face in trying a case, two in the
public corruption case should be highlighted: (a) for the government, how much
the prosecutor can shape the testimony of a cooperating witness to make it
effective yet fulfill the obligation to ensure that the truth be ascertained and the
due process rights of the defendant be respected; and (b) for either side, what to
do when the Witness testifying at trial suddenly adds facts or strengthens the
recall of events beyond what was discussed during preparation; in other words,
determining when does testimony become false under Model Rule 3.3.
A. PREPARING THE COOPERATING WITNESS AND THE BRADY
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION
Preparing a witness, especially the one who will directly accuse the defendant
of engaging in criminal conduct, is of the utmost importance in a criminal case.
Unlike the typical eyewitness, however, the cooperating witness in a public
corruption case is not going to describe the crime like the victim of a robbery or
observer of a drug deal testifies about a sequence of observable events and the
identity of the perpetrators. In bribery and kickback cases, like most white collar
criminal prosecutions, there is usually no real dispute regarding the facts of the
underlying transaction. It is often conceded that the payment was made or the
benefit conferred, and then that a governmental decision was implemented (or
deferred).
The recall about the details of the events or physical characteristics of the
perpetrator is not what is important; the intent of the participants in the process is
38. See W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of
the Law, 30 T)Lx. TECH L. REv. 1343, 1349 (1999) ("But how do we know when the result of a session in the
horse shed [with a witness] is refreshing recollection, and when it is prompting perjury?"); Charles Silver,
Preliminary Thoughts on the Economics of Witness Preparation, 30 TEx. TcH L. REv. 1383, 1383 (1999)
("Everyone knows that it is wrong to ask a witness to lie. What is not known is how far a lawyer can properly
push a witness short of that.").
[Vol. 23:351
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key. While there may be some dispute about what was said between the parties,
the issue is really one of what each side understood, and whether the public
official misused the authority conferred by public office. The decision at issue
need not be shown to be incorrect, and it is not a defense to a public corruption
prosecution to argue that the act was outside the public official's authority or
would have occurred regardless of the personal benefit.39
A cooperating witness has likely gone through two rounds of intense
preparation before testifying at trial. First, the defense lawyer for the witness will
have to prepare him or her for sessions with the prosecutors before the final
decision is made to enter into the plea agreement, called "woodshedding" or
"horseshedding" the witness.4 ° Prosecutors are fond of saying they will not buy
"a pig in a poke," so they need to preview the person to ascertain whether he or
she will be a good witness and can provide the type of information that will
advance the case.4 1 Second, after the deal is made, the prosecutor has to prepare
the witness for trial and determine how best to present a witness who made a deal
and thus will be subject to a strong cross-examination attempting to show that the
testimony is a fabrication to mitigate the witness's potential prison sentence-the
"deal with the devil" problem.
In all of these rounds of preparation, the witness's testimony will be shaped by
defense lawyers and prosecutors who will want the person to say certain things
and describe the process in a way that will be favorable to showing the
defendant's corrupt intent. The meaning of phrases and the types of gestures
made by the recipient of a bribe or the public official seeking a kickback on a
contract will be crucial. The case is not only a matter of "who said what when?"
but also "what did you understand that to mean?" and "was the person hostile or
friendly, cajoling or demanding?" Over time, the cooperating witness may adopt
the viewpoint of the prosecutors, perhaps seeing more in the transaction than
39. See United States v. Gjieli, 717 F.2d 968, 976 (6th Cir. 1983):
The deterrent value of punishing the bad intent of bribers is the same regardless of whether or not the
acts to be accomplished are within the scope of the actual lawful duties of the bribed public official
and regardless of whether te briber has correctly perceived the precise scope of the official's lawful
duties.
40. See Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, The Pitfalls of Preparing a Lay Witness for Trial, 23 Am.
BANKR. INsT. J. 22, 52 (June 2004) ("The best method of finding out how a witness will testify, and exactly what
he/she will say, is a good, old-fashioned woodshed session-essentially, talking to the witness alone so that the
witness's attention is focused on trial preparation."); Hodes, supra note 38, at 1366 ("Arming the client with
pertinent legal information and trusting the client to make good and legitimate use of it demonstrates loyalty and
zealousness. Recognizing that at some point a loyal servant can be manipulated into becoming an accomplice in
crime is honoring the bounds of law. And knowing how to flirt with that boundary line but not cross over it is
true professionalism.").
41. See John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 1797, 1833 (2001)
("In the American system, witness preparation is an art form. American prosecutors are among its most
practiced and capable artists. Cooperating accomplices receive much of their artistic attention.").
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really occurred at the time.42 Frequently, public corruption cases get to trial years
after the transactions at issue, and so memories may be tainted by the unintended
bias of a witness who wants to be accommodating to the prosecution, perhaps
reflecting the desire to have your side win the case.
For the prosecutor, there are competing pressures in pursuing the case.
Convinced by evidence purportedly showing a legal violation that can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor's focus becomes winning the case.
Public corruption cases involve the core values of a democratic society: fair and
equal treatment of all, and the punishment of abuse of government power so that
our political institutions can function properly. 43 Thus, achieving a conviction
takes on even greater importance because of the political and social implications
of corruption. At the same time, the admonition of the Supreme Court in Berger v.
United States to prosecutors remains particularly relevant, cautioning that "while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."'
Among the most important obligations of a prosecutor is to furnish exculpa-
tory evidence to a defendant. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
• punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 45 In
Giglio v. United States, the Court included within the Brady disclosure
requirement impeachment information if the reliability of the witness may be
determinative of the defendant's guilt.46
The disclosure obligation imposed by Brady and Giglio is familiar to all
prosecutors. When getting a witness ready for trial, -however, the line between
permissible preparation and impermissible influence that may lead to false
testimony is difficult to discern. A prosecutor would be unlikely to ask the witness
to commit perjury, and the prohibition on such conduct is clear under both the
42. See United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cit. 1980) ("We think it obvious that promises
of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong inducement to falsify
in that case."); Douglass, supra note 41, at 1833 ("In sum, when we assess reliability, there is no reason to favor
the live testimony of a cooperating accomplice over a blame-shifting jailhouse confession on the basis of the
incentives which may shape, and shade, the accomplice's story. If anything, the incentive to favor the
government is stronger by the time the accomplice finds his way to the witness stand.").
43. See SusAN RoSE-AcKERMAN, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPrnON AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997), at 31, 45 (Bribery "undermines the legitimacy of governments,
especially democracies .... Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest
bidder. Corruption undermines claims that government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on
ability to pay. It can lead to coups by undemocratic leaders.").
44. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
45. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
46. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
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professional responsibility rules and Supreme Court precedent.47 But the shaping
of a witness's testimony may itself raise questions about the scope of the
witness's recollection and provide a basis to impeach the witness. Under Brady,
this evidence would have to be disclosed to the defense. The prosecutor who
comes close to the line of suggesting how a cooperating witness should testify or
correcting perceived errors so that the testimony is consistent with other aspects
of the government's evidence may not violate Model Rule 3.3 prohibition on
presenting false testimony, but the information could come within the due
process requirement for the government to disclose material exculpatory
evidence to the defense.48
The interplay between the cooperating witness and the prosecutor often occurs
outside the presence of a third party, such as counsel for the witness or case
agents who may write a report of the preparation session.4 9 A witness interview
during an investigation usually results in a report of some kind that can be turned
over to the defense under Brady or as a Jencks Act statement, while pre-trial
preparation often involves just the witness and government attorney. The
prosecutor has discretion to keep the sessions with the witness within the bounds
of propriety and to disclose any exculpatory information that might come out of
the preparation process .5  Brady is not limited to written materials, so an oral
statement of a cooperating witness must be disclosed if it is exculpatory. Is that
being done by prosecutors?
51
B. THE WITNESS WHO DOES BETTER THAN EXPECTED
The issue of witness perjury is not a new one, and the professional
responsibility rules make it clear that a lawyer cannot allow a witness, including a
client, to present false testimony and must take steps to remedy the situation if it
47. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959) (explaining that a new trial is required whenever false
testimony could "in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury").
48. The Department of Justice issued a memorandum on January 4, 2010, Guidance for Prosecutors
Regarding Criminal Discovery, that states,
Trial preparation meetings with witnesses generally need not be memorialized. However, prosecutors
should be particularly attuned to new or inconsistent information disclosed by the witness during a
pre-trial witness preparation session. New information that is exculpatory or impeachment
information should be disclosed consistent with the provisions of USAM § 9-5.001 even if the
information is first disclosed in a witness preparation session.
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General on Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding
Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010) http://www.justice.gov/dagldiscovery-guidance.htmnl.
49. There are prosecutors who will only meet with a potential witness in the presence of a third party, such as
a case agent, to limit possible claims of improper conduct in the meeting.
50. See Department of Justice Memorandum, supra note 48.
51. See Gershman, supra note 7, at 834 ("[T]he absence of any contemporaneous record of the prosecutor's
preparation of witnesses encourages improper coaching by hiding the process from meaningful oversight by
courts or defense counsel.").
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does occur.52 The much harder issue of what the defense lawyer must do when
the client-defendant intends to testify falsely has been the subject of significant
debate in both the courts and the academic literature 3 As the Supreme Court
noted in the leading case of Nix v. Whiteside, "[w]hatever the scope of a
constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not extend to
testifyingfalsely.
'
,
54
It should be clear to anyone who reads Nix that the case was easy to decide
because the Court essentially adopted the viewpoint of the defense lawyer, Gary
L. Robinson, who had concluded that his client planned to commit perjury in his
trial testimony to support a self-defense claim to a murder charge. As summarized
in Nix:
Until shortly before trial, Whiteside consistently stated to Robinson that he had
not actually seen a gun, but that he was convinced that Love had a gun in his
hand. About a week before trial, during preparation for direct examination,
Whiteside for the first time told Robinson and his associate Donna Paulsen that
he had seen something "metallic" in Love's hand. When asked about this,
Whiteside responded: "[I]n Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't say
I saw a gun, I'm dead." 55
Mr. Robinson's determination that his client intended to commit perjury
occurred in the course of preparing him to testify at his murder trial, and the effort
to dissuade Nix from committing perjury complied fully with the rules of the
profession. As the Court noted,
[wihether Robinson's conduct is seen as a successful attempt to dissuade his
client from committing the crime of perjury, or whether seen as a 'threat' to
withdraw from representation and disclose the illegal scheme, Robinson's
representation of Whiteside falls well within accepted standards of professional
conduct and the range of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under
Strickland [v. Washington].56
Nix presents a stark example of potential client perjury when the defendant
wanted to add a critical fact to his eyewitness testimony that would add
52. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3(a)(3).
53. The classic article on this issue is Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). The California Court of Appeals
reviewed the various approaches to client perjury in People v. Johnson. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998).
54. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 160-61. As happens with criminal defendants, the suggestion of a fellow prisoner-perhaps Mr.
Cook himself-is taken as the requisite for a successful defense.
56. Id. at 171. The issue in Nix was whether Robinson provided ineffective assistance of counsel in stating
that he would withdraw and inform the court should the defendant testify falsely. The Court's statement that he
came "well within accepted standards of professional conduct" is about as high a compliment as can be paid to
an attorney in this context. Id.
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significant weight to the self-defense argument for acquittal. In public corruption
cases, the focus on intent, which is usually inferred from an array of evidence,
means that any false testimony is unlikely to be as clearly probative as Nix's
potential perjury. For example, the meetings between a public official and a
lobbyist and any transfer of money or other benefits are likely to be established by
records, so the likelihood that a witness would fabricate testimony to create a
meeting or bribe that did not occur is unlikely. The greater possibility for false
testimony is more a matter of the nuances of the interactions, such as whether an
official demanded a payment or merely made a vague suggestion, a distinction
that may reflect as much tone or inflection as the words themselves. Moreover,
the strength of the witness's recall of the details of the meeting that support the
recollection can strengthen (or diminish) the veracity of the testimony.
For the prosecutor and the defense lawyer in the public corruption prosecution,
the case that is far harder than Nix is when the witness or defendant adds new
information during the testimony that may strengthen his or her credibility.57 It
could be testimony about a statement made by the official that had not been
mentioned before, or a disclaimer of knowledge regarding a transaction that was
discussed during preparatory sessions. Unlike the "something 'metallic' in Nix,
the testimony may not be clearly false, or it may be just one piece of a much
57. The defense lawyer for the person who is trying to make a deal with the government by cooperating in its
investigation can face a similar issue if the client adds details to strengthen the case against another target of the
investigation. Unlike the client or witness testifying at trial, there is no public exposure of the statements, only
the presence of the defense lawyer to ensure that it is correct. The attorney is in a difficult position when the
client is proffering information to the government in the hope of receiving a plea bargain with reduced charges
and a lower punishment because the better the information the greater the government's incentive to make a
deal. The lawyer must be particularly attuned to any "enhancement" of the information being provided by the
client because false statements could in fact scuttle a plea agreement and lead the government to prosecute the
witness. This can create a sufficient counterbalance to reduce the cooperating witness's incentive to lie.
The danger of a cooperating witness committing perjury was shown in United States v. Wallach, when the
Second Circuit overturned the convictions of the defendants because a witness (Guariglia), described as the
"centerpiece" of the prosecution, lied about his continuing gambling after denying on the witness stand that
he had done so. 935 F.2d 445, 457 (2d Cir. 1991). The circuit court found that the government did not know the
witness was committing perjury during the trial, but the witness's improbable explanations about taking cash
advances from casinos were sufficiently suspicious to undermine his credibility and required prosecutors to
investigate his possible gambling further. Id. The court explained:
Guariglia was the centerpiece of the government's case. Had it been brought to the attention of the
jury that Guariglia was lying after he had purportedly undergone a moral transformation and decided
to change his ways, his entire testimony may have been rejected by the jury. It was one thing for the
jury to learn that Guariglia had a history of improprieties; it would have been an entirely different
matter for them to learn that after having taken an oath to speak the truth he made a conscious decision
to lie. While the jury was instructed that Moreno was an acknowledged perjurer whose testimony
should be weighed carefully, no such instruction was given relative to Guariglia's testimony.
Accordingly, because we are convinced that the government should have known that Guariglia was
committing perjury, all the convictions must be reversed.
Id. at 457. The importance of cooperating witnesses makes it imperative for prosecutors to ensure that they are
telling the truth to avoid having a conviction overturned because of negligence on their part.
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larger mosaic presented through the witness. What does a lawyer do when the
witness-and perhaps even the client-starts adding details that had not come up
during trial preparation to make the testimony potentially more persuasive?58
When is the line between inevitable minor errors of recall and perjury crossed?
One potential safeguard can give an attorney some comfort if this occurs:
cross-examination. Wigmore's famous phrase about cross-examination is that it
is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 59 A wary
opponent should be able to expose the inconsistencies in the testimony through a
clever examination of the falsifying witness, thus strengthening that side's case
by undermining the credibility of the opponent. For the cooperating witness, in
all likelihood one or more reports of earlier interviews exist that can be used to
cross-examine, although these reports may not be very thorough or may not
address all the points that a witness testified about. The report is that of an agent,
not the witness, so its utility in cross-examination may be limited. 60 For the
testifying defendant, a report recounting a prior meeting is less likely to be
available, although if the person agreed to be interviewed early on in the
investigation there may be recorded statements that can be used.
Cross-examination may not be the great legal engine espoused by Wigmore,
especially in a federal criminal prosecution which does not include open
discovery and in which the preparation sessions between a witness and the lawyer
are not necessarily subject to any outside 'crutiny. Although some prosecutors
use the "open file" discovery method,61 not all do, and. from the government's
58. See Gershman, supra note 7, at 835 ("A major incentive for prosecutors to use cooperating witnesses is to
support an uncertain but consistent version of the facts, rather than to confirm an inconsistent version of the facts
that may represent more of the truth.").
59. 5 JOIN HENRY WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).
60. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2, the government must produce a "statement" made by
any of its witnesses, which is defined to include "a written statement that the witness makes and signs, or
otherwise adopts or approves" or "a substantially verbatim, contemporaneously recorded recital of the witness's
oral statement that is contained in any recording or any transcription of a recording." FED. R. CRim. P.
26.2(f)(l)-(2). If the interview notes are those of an agent that do not purport to be a verbatim recital of the
witness's statement or is not adopted by the witness, then it need not be produced to the defense. See United
States v. Bobadilla-Lopez, 954 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Both the history of the statute and the decisions
interpreting it have stressed that for production to be required, the materials should not only reflect the witness'
own words, but should also be in the nature of a complete recital that eliminates the possibility of portions being
selected out of context.").
61. As the name implies, open file discovery is when the prosecutor supplies all information related to a case,
except for privileged communications and work product, to the defendant in advance of trial. One advantage of
this approach is that it avoids having the prosecutor determine what evidence constitutes Brady material
because all documents are provided, regardless of whether they are inculpatory or exculpatory. See Robert P.
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical
Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 257, 310 (2008) ("The beauty of full open-file
discovery is obvious as a remedy for the difficulty of subjective choice in a competitive adversarial
environment. It does not require a prosecutor to make difficult discretionary decisions.").
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perspective it has no access to the defendant once charges are filed.62 Putting the
onus on the opponent to ferret out any falsity in a witness's testimony may not be
the best method of preventing a violation of Model Rule 3.3, which does not
prohibit the introduction of false testimony "unless you can get away with it."
The lack of access to information about witness preparation is exacerbated for
the defense lawyer because it is in the client's interest to allow the testimony to go
forward in the hope that the jury will return a not guilty verdict. As one lawyer put
it very aptly, "a trial may be a search for truth, but I-as a defense attorney-am
not part of the search party.",63 If the testimony does not reach the level of falsity
outlined in Nix, and perhaps even if it does, then there is a question of whether
defense counsel has an obligation under the professional conduct rules to
intervene or even disclose it to the court.64
When the lawyer does not know what the truth actually is, then what should the
person do about a client or witness who is a very good liar? If someone is able to
testify convincingly, even if the lawyer questions the testimony's truth, it may be
permissible to have the witness testify. Model Rule 3.3 prohibits a lawyer from
"knowingly" offering false evidence, which means the attorney must have actual
knowledge and not just a suspicion.65 The age-old issue is, when does a lawyer
really know the witness or client is not testifying truthfully? Even the strict
prohibition on using false evidence is mitigated in the Model Rules if the lawyer
does not reach the level of actual knowledge, and the Comment to Rule 3.3 states
that "[a] lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its
presentation to the trier of fact.",66 The drafters try to mitigate this by further
62. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevents the government from calling a
defendant to testify at trial, and the prosecution cannot comment on a defendant's decision not to testify. See
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal
Government and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.").
Prior to trial, a person cannot be forced to testify against himself in a police interrogation, before a grand jury,
or even in a civil proceeding if the answer may be incriminating. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248,
266 n.1 (1983) ("A witness is generally entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination whenever there is a realistic possibility that his answer to a question can be used in any way to
convict him of a crime. It need not be probable that a criminal prosecution will be brought or that the witness's
answer will be introduced in a later prosecution; the witness need only show a realistic possibility that his
answer will be used against him. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment forbids not only the compulsion of testimony
that would itself be admissible in a criminal prosecution, but also the compulsion of testimony, whether or not
itself admissible, that may aid in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at trial.").
63. Gerald L. Shargel, Federal Evidence Rule 608(b): Gateway to the Minefield of Witness Preparation,
76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1263, 1267 (2007).
64. Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits offering evidence the lawyer "knows to be false." MODEL RuLEs R.
3.3(a)(3). If the lawyer does not know it is false because it is not clear that the testimony is in fact incorrect, then
the obligation not to introduce the evidence is not triggered.
65. Model Rule 1.0(f) provides that "[k]nowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the
fact in question." MODEL RuLEs R. 1.0(f). The actual knowledge standard means that even a reasonable
suspicion would not constitute the requisite knowledge to trigger the prohibition of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3).
66. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3 cmt. 1 [8].
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETics
stating that "although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of
testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an
obvious falsehood." The distinction appears to be one between a "mere"
falsehood-something a teenager might call a "kinda lie"-and one that is
clearly false.
CONCLUSION
Public corruption cases are among the most significant that federal prosecutors
pursue because of their impact on society. For the public official, even an ac-
cusation of corruption can end a career,67 and a conviction means that the person
in all likelihood will never again be trusted with public office. The trial in this
type of case hinges on proving the transaction at issue was "corrupt" and not just
an acceptable interaction between an official and members of the public. The
testimony of witnesses, most importantly the defendant and any participant in the
allegedly corrupt exchange who agrees to cooperate, will be the focal point of the
trial. Thus, preparing these witnesses for trial is crucial.
While courts and the professional responsibility rules acknowledge the
importance of witness preparation, they do little to identify when an attorney
crosses the line into creating (or allowing) false testimony. Even the most
scrupulous lawyer cannot protect against a witness embellishing on the witness
stand, but the dilemma is what to do when that happens. While the rule is clear
that false testimony is impermissible, that begs the question of what constitutes
"false."
I will not pretend to offer any proscriptions that will solve the issue of when
testimony is false, or what a lawyer is required to do in a particular situation. The
professional responsibility rules put the onus on the individual lawyer to decide
what to do, and there is no set of guidelines that can be provided for judging how
far witness preparation can go or to say when testimony crosses the line into
falsity and perhaps even perjury. It is ultimately the lawyer's personal sense of
propriety-the individual's moral compass-that will determine what is appropri-
ate.
67. Public corruption investigations occasionally have the public official who is the target voluntarily testify
before the grand jury in an attempt to forestall an indictment, a risky proposition, and one rarely tried in other
types of white collar criminal investigations.
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